UNS vesti

30. 08. 2011.

Izvor: Wikileaks

Američka ambasada o srpskim medijima

Depeša ambasadora SAD u Srbiji Kamerona Mantera od 16.1.2009.

SUBJECT: SERBS REWRITE HISTORY: MEDIA CAMPAIGN GEARS UP AS NATO BOMBING ANNIVERSARY APPROACHES

Summary..................... ¶1. (SBU) March 24th will mark the tenth anniversary of the start of the NATO bombing campaign against the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. With two articles published in widely-read dailies on January 15, the Serbian media continues with its "Serbs as victims" theme, casting the Albanians as the aggressors and NATO as aiding and abetting them. This revision of history in advance of the anniversary and the first hearings before the International Court of Justice on Serbia's case challenging the legality of Kosovo's independence will only accelerate in coming weeks. End Summary.

Albanian Atrocities in June 1999 -------------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) On January 15, Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti published an article entitled "Albanians Killed, NATO Covered Up," which alleged that Albanians committed war crimes, including ethnic cleansing, after NATO forces entered Kosovo in June 1999. The article was based on a December 18 article in the Italian weekly magazine Panorama, titled "The Hidden Truth: Massacres of Serbs," which makes no mention of a NATO role in a cover-up, according to the Italian Embassy. The Panorama article did quote (retired) Italian General Mauro del Vecchio, in command of an Italian KFOR brigade posted in Kosovo in 1999, and Peruvian diplomat Pablo Jose Baraibar, who headed the UNMIK Missing Persons office, and also included pictures reportedly taken by Italian soldiers, which allegedly show bodies of Serbian civilians. (Comment: Serb media has a history of showing photographs of victims and claiming them as Serbs. While the international press was showing the horrors of Serb-run Omarska Prison Camp during the war in Bosnia, for example, Serb media used the same images claiming the detainees were Serbs. End Comment.)

¶3. (U) The Vecernje Novosti article, which reprinted two of the Panorama pictures, reported that del Vecchio, currently an
opposition politician in the Italian parliament, stated that during his first 20 days in Kosovo he received daily reports of Serb and Roma corpses left along the roads and that "the smell of death was omnipresent." He also is quoted as saying that Albanians burned Serb houses and destroyed Serb churches and monasteries.

¶4. (U) Baraibar in turn talked about an investigation that he carried out in 2005 into the July 1998 kidnapping of Serb civilians near Orahovac. Citing a female survivor of the kidnapping, he implicated current Kosovo Assembly chairman Jakup Krasniqi, a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) officer at the time, and former Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku in the crimes. Baribar further claimed that neither the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) nor the Kosovo judicial system was interested in the evidence that he collected.

Racak False Pretense for Bombing -------------------------------- ¶5. (U) In its January 15 article, the daily Politika focused on
events that occurred 10 years earlier in the southwestern Kosovo village of Racak when bodies of Albanians, whom the Serbs insisted were KLA members, not civilians, were found. The article argued that efforts to soften the court of public opinion for the NATO bombing began that day when then-OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission head William Walker characterized the deaths as a "massacre" in the presence of foreign and Albanian journalists.

¶6. (U) Declaring that the past ten years have proven that Walker's conclusions are far from indisputable, the article heavily cited statements made by Finnish forensic dentist Helena Ranta in her autobiography in 2008 and in a Russian documentary film. In these statements, Ranta alleged that Walker and Finnish Foreign Ministry officials pressured her to conclude as she told the media in 1999 that Racak was a "crime against humanity." In the film, she reportedly stated that the bodies discovered in Racak were "terrorists, Serb soldiers, and local inhabitants."

Comment ------- ¶7. (SBU) As the March anniversary of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign approaches and with initial briefs due before the ICJ in April, we can expect the Serbian media to continue to distort the NATO intervention and its casus belli. Contacts close to the government have told us that the MFA is pushing this effort along. Though the intent is mostly for domestic consumption, comments of

BELGRADE 00000049 002 OF 002

"internationals" such as del Vecchio, Baraibar, and Ranta lend
credibility to Serbia's growing argument that Serb actions in Kosovo
were self-defense and that the NATO bombing further victimized
Serbs. End Comment.

MUNTER
Preneto sa http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09BELGRADE49.html

Depeša otpravnice poslova ambasade SAD u Srbiji Dženifer Braš od 24.7.2008.

SERBIAN PUBLIC REACTION TO KARADZIC ARREST MUTED

Origin
Embassy Belgrade (Serbia)

Cable time
Thu, 24 Jul 2008 18:57 UTC

Classification
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Source
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08BELGRADE744.html

History
First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC

SUBJECT: SERBIAN PUBLIC REACTION TO KARADZIC ARREST MUTED REF: BELGRADE 718
Summary ------- ¶1. (SBU) Public reaction to the July 21 arrest of Radovan Karadzic, indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), thus far has been confined to a few small demonstrations by ultra-right groups and Radical Party members, although thousands of soccer fans cheered Karadzic at a recent game. Human rights NGOs say the public now understands that the arrest is a necessary step in the process of EU integration. Media coverage has been extensive and typical of the character of the media outlet, with independent media focusing on the reasons for Karadzic's arrest and the tabloids lionizing him. We will likely not see any mass demonstrations, even if the public does not fully support the arrest. The public recognition that Serbia must face forward and the government's willingness to effect this politically difficult arrest are encouraging. End Summary.

Small Protests by Right-Wing Groups ----------------------------------- ¶2. (U) Public reactions to the arrest of Karadzic have thus far not been strong. There have been a few protests from nationalist elements (reftel). Early on July 22, immediately following the announcement of the arrest, police broke up a protest by about a dozen youth in Republic Square. Another similar group marched across from the Special Court. ¶3. (U) The ultra-right group Obraz organized protests on July 22 and 23 in Belgrade's Republic Square, with Karadzic's brother Luka and various Serbian Radical Party (SRS) officials in attendance. Each demonstration attracted 200-300 protestors, sporting t-shirts with the images of both Karadzic, fellow Hague indictee Ratko Mladic, and Hague defendant and Radical leader Vojislav Seselj. Protestors carried signs urging President Boris Tadic (Democratic Party--DS) to commit suicide. Police told us they intervened on July 22 after witnessing vandalism of nearby restaurants and hearing an explosion (flares and firecrackers, according to press reports). Protestors on July 23 burned the Socialist Party (SPS) flag and threw beer bottles at reporters. The SRS has announced that it will organize its own protest the evening of July 24. ¶4. (U) While the demonstrations have been small, at a July 23 Partisan soccer game the majority of the 15,000 fans spent the first half hour of the game cheering Karadzic rather than their team. They also chanted "Kill yourself and save Serbia, Boris Tadic," and burned DS and Liberal Democratic Party flags. (Comment: Soccer club "fans" are also notorious thugs for hire. The rioter who died in the Embassy during the February 21 attack was eulogized as a Partizan "fan," and soccer games have been known to morph into protests of the events of the day. Serbian riot police are regularly mobilized throughout the city on the night of a soccer match. End Comment.)

No Big Reaction Likely ---------------------- ¶5. (SBU) Biljana Kovacevic-Vuco of the Lawyer's Committee on Human Rights (YUCOM) predicted to us on July 23 the arrest would not provoke any greater demonstrations. Sonja Biserko of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia shared the same assessment, explaining that large displays of ultra-nationalism were over -- "they were done with this after the reaction to Kosovo." Biserko said the arrest had probably happened due to international pressure rather than a domestic desire to confront the past. "The people are not less nationalistic, but they know where their priorities are." People were oriented toward a European future rather than the past, she said. ¶6. (SBU) Kovacevic-Vuco said the government had a responsibility to show that it had a new policy of sincerely facing up to the past and avoid the ambivalent stance past governments had taken when Milosevic and Seselj went to the Hague. This time it was up to the government to portray Karadzic as a war criminal and tell the Serbian public that he should be prosecuted and why, she said.

Extensive Media Coverage ------------------------ ¶7. (U) Local media have been covering the arrest extensively since it was announced. B92 and Fox TV immediately interrupted their evening programs and started special programs on the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, which lasted several hours and included short documentaries on Karadzic, reactions by various public figures, and coverage of the Special Court where Karadzic was held. B92 continued with a special program almost all day July 22 and July 23, including documentaries produced in the wake of the October 5th BELGRADE 00000744 002 OF 002 revolution, with footage of the siege of Sarajevo and information on Karadzic's role in it. Belgrade TV station Studio B prepared a special midnight news and non-regular news programs at 1 and 2 am. National broadcaster RTS, by contrast, continued with its regular program schedule, reporting on the arrest only during the regular news program. ¶8. (U) All major dailies on July 22 carried the story on their front pages and published the reactions of local and foreign officials, as well as details from Karadzic's bio. Dailies on July 23 and 24 continued to feature the story on their front pages and with very extensive coverage. The reports in all major dailies were mostly factual and straightforward, though the tabloids were consumed with the details of his arrest and where he had been living. Pro-Radical Glas Javnosti and Kurir carried interviews and statements by Karadzic's biggest supporters.

Impact of Media Coverage Likely Low ----------------------------------- ¶9. (SBU) Srdjan Bogosavljevic, head of the polling firm Strategic Marketing, said the media coverage, even the vivid footage of atrocities committed in Bosnia, would not move a public that viewed the ICTY with great distrust. Strategic Marketing's surveys over the years had shown that most people did not want to see the footage and believed it was one-sided -- only Serbs were filmed while Muslims were committing horrific acts off camera. Moreover, B92's audience was already open to facing the past and had likely seen the footage before. ¶10. (SBU) Bogosavljevic said it would be significant if RTS with its wider and less-educated audience would show such footage, but he did not believe that the government would be able to get the network (still controlled by former PM Kostunica appointee Aleksandar Tijanic) to support the new party line in the near future. The tabloids, meanwhile, were showing Karadzic as a sympathetic figure.

Comment ------- ¶11. (SBU) It is unlikely that the SRS and DSS, now lacking control of state resources, will be able to organize any mass demonstrations such as the ones in February to protest Kosovo independence. The lack of strong public outcry, however, is not necessarily a signal that the Serbian public supports the government's action. While Serbian citizens may not be fully ready to confront the past, it is encouraging that they recognize it is time to face the future -- and that they now have a government willing to do so. End Comment.
BRUSH

Preneto sa http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08BELGRADE744.html

Depeša ambasadorke SAD u Srbiji Meri Vorlik od 26.02.2010.

SUBJECT: SERBIA: Recipe for a NATO Debate - Let Stand 10 Years Then
Stir

10BELGRADE324
2010-02-26 11:11
2011-08-26 00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Belgrade

Summary ------- ¶1. (SBU) In recent months Serbian media and civil society have tossed a decade of taboos out the window by publishing letters, op-eds and articles that openly debate Serbia's future relationship with NATO, which they have portrayed for years as a "criminal organization." Despite sharp emotional divisions between supporters and opponents of membership and the political opportunism driving much of the negative rhetoric, the debate has succeeded in laying out some basic facts about the alliance, and for the first time since the 1999 bombing campaign the public has been confronted with the heretofore unthinkable: that Serbia might one day be a member. Even the Russians seem concerned with the turn of events and have weighed in with their own op-eds. For our part, Post has engaged early with the media and NGO community, encouraging objective discussion and stating publicly that NATO's doors are open. End Summary.

The Debate ---------- ¶2. (SBU) Serbia's public debate over NATO membership is alternately irrational and sophisticated, a clash between anger over the past and longing for future relevance. Opponents of membership paint NATO as an anti-Russian war machine, focus on the 1999 intervention, and claim Serbia would be forced to recognize Kosovo in order to join. Advocates note that Serbia will soon be surrounded by NATO members - some, even within the government, supporting Euro-Atlantic integration of the entire region - and appeal for a more pragmatic approach. Increasingly, the arguments have become sober, analytic and economic.

¶3. (SBU) In the absence of a clear long-term government policy, military analysts, academics and pro-western NGOs have all taken up the issue with zest, publishing op-eds and organizing roundtables and media events. In one case, an NGO included the mother of a "NATO victim" at a panel discussion who advocated NATO membership as a way to expose the truth of Milosevic's crimes. Another group invited Jamie Shea - notorious here as NATO's spokesperson during the 1999 Kosovo campaign - to speak via DVC to a young audience. In contrast, TV talk shows have been negative or inconclusive at best, with NATO opponents playing on emotions, abusing facts and attacking supporters as "NATO lobbyists." Supporters have thus far been unprepared for this kind of live, gloves-off fight, a liability in this society where strong, emotional rhetoric is valued over mere logical argumentation and where most citizens get their news from television.

¶4. (U) Probably the most important contribution to rational discussion of the issue has come from intellectual daily Politika, which has placed an even mixture of pro and con articles from analysts and activists alike. Yet several other dailies, even including sensationalist and traditionally anti-western Press, Kurir and Glas Javnosti, have published NATO op-eds on both sides of the discussion.

¶5. (SBU) In one bitter op-ed published in daily Politika, military analyst Miroslav Lazansky, the nephew of convicted war criminal Biljana Plavsic, who has built a career railing against the western military complex while privately seeking every opportunity to admire it in person, conjured the specter of NATO one day sneaking atomic weapons into the Serbian heartland. A confident critic under normal circumstances, Lazansky's shrill tone shows that the apparent change in climate has touched a nerve among die-hard opponents.

Supporting Objective Discussion -------------------------------- ¶6. (SBU) Since the 10th anniversary of the NATO campaign in March 2009, Post has been proactively engaged in supporting NATO public education projects, steering AEECA media training funds, democracy grants and Post resources towards the subject of Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO study tours. Many of the dozen or so projects resulted in TV programs dedicated to the subject, and our efforts, combined with those of the Czech Embassy (NATO's Contact Point Embassy) and NATO PD, have contributed to the current re-examination of Serbia's "neutrality" stance. In a September 2009 meeting with the new editor-in-chief of Politika daily, we expressed our hope that the media would begin educating the public about NATO. In October, the debate began with a trickle of letters and articles placed weekly in Politika presenting the alliance in a factual light, and hinting at Serbian membership as one possible future.

¶7. (SBU) In November 2009, we placed an op-ed in Politika that gently challenged several hard-core NATO myths and encouraged a local NGO to tackle the sole negative response. The debate soon took on a life of its own. It reached a fever pitch in January when, after Defense Minister Sutanovac hinted that NATO might be in Serbia's future, a group of "200 intellectuals" held a press conference to condemn the government's alleged efforts to "secretly" bring Serbia into NATO, and called for an immediate referendum to allow the public to voice its objection.

¶8. (SBU) Emboffs have been active at roundtables, and Ambassador Warlick made the U.S. position clear in her first press interview on February 8, saying "the U.S. fully supports Serbia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and is doing everything to help its efforts in that direction." In several end-of-the-year interviews, then-Charge d'Affaires Jennifer Brush highlighted that "Serbia's NATO membership is the decision for Serbia to make," while stressing that other countries in the region have recognized the benefits of joining. "We only hope for an open, honest and rational debate, based on facts not emotions. NATO remains open to a deeper level of cooperation with Serbia on Serbia's timetable," Brush told Beta News Service. The political and public affairs counselors have participated in a series of roundtable discussions around Serbia on the pros and cons of NATO membership.

GoS: One Step Forward (oops) One Back

--------------------------------------

¶9. (SBU) Mindful of the polls and fearful of attacks from the opposition, the government has been coy on the topic. However, Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac, known for his pro-NATO stance, has publicly painted NATO in friendlier colors, arguing the merits of closer collaboration and saying "NATO is no longer Serbia's enemy." The initial firestorm that resulted from his comments implying Serbia might become a member appears to have led to a retreat from such public statements, but Sutanovac continues to advocate the need to achieve NATO military standards and expand Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities and Serbia's engagement in various UN peacekeeping operations.

Referendum against NATO ----------------------- ¶10. (U) The January 11 initiative by a group of 200 political, intellectual, and religious leaders close to former Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) to demand a referendum on NATO membership had the unintended effect of  promoting broader discussion. The petition, read by Serbian influential intellectual and a member of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Matija Beckovic at a press conference, says that Serbia has never belonged to a military alliance, recalls the 1999 "criminal" NATO bombing of the country, and credits NATO with creating the "phony state" of Kosovo. Signatories include Kostunica, Association of Journalists of Serbia Chairwoman Ljiljana Smajlovic, film director Emir Kusturica, writer Dobrica Cosic, and
even Serbian Orthodox Church bishops Atanasije, Hrizostom, and Artemije.

¶11. (U) In response, pro-NATO activists pointed out there was no referendum on neutrality before Parliament issued its neutrality declaration in December 2007. Government officials hedged that there was no need for a referendum, since membership "isn't on the agenda," but that "one day" the people would need to be asked.

¶12. (U) Political analyst Djordje Vukadinovic, close to DSS, told Blic that the initiative had been launched several months ago but was announced in January primarily in response to Defense Minister Sutanovac, LDP leader Cedomir Jovanovic, and several pro-NATO non-government organizations that expressed support for Serbian integration with NATO. Blic suggested that the referendum aimed to unite the opposition at a time when the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has called for elections. "It is no secret that all parties in the ruling coalition are not united regarding the stance toward NATO, and the initiative might cause problems within the ruling coalition," Vladimir Goati, director of Transparency Serbia, told the paper.

Russia's Counter-Offensive -------------------------- ¶13. (U) Russian officials have become increasingly vocal on the subject. "I do not believe that the Serbian people wish to join NATO," Politika quoted President of the Russian Parliament Committee for International Relations Konstantin Kosachev on January 13. In a February 6 interview with daily Blic, Russia's Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin said the fact that most NATO member states have recognized Kosovo is an "obstacle" for joining NATO. "Belgrade will have to officially recognize Pristina's sovereignty, which will also change the stances of Moscow," he said, adding that"If Serbia wants to join NATO, it will have to give up Kosovo." If Serbia insists on joining NATO, "Russia would be forced to reexamine its stand towards Kosovo," because, Rogozin said, "Russians cannot be bigger Serbs than Serbs."

¶14. (U) This statement triggered a rare, if restrained backlash. "It becomes clear that the Russian stance towards Kosovo is not a position that comes from a great friendship or love [for Serbia], but from their own interest," Filip Ejdus, a member of the Forum for International Relations said a Blic article entitled "Is Moscow Blackmailing [us]?" NGO activist Miljenko Dereta echoed that Russian "blackmail" aims only to protect Russia's political and economic interests in the region.

¶15. (SBU) Russian Ambassador to Belgrade Alexander Konuzin then escalated the rhetoric. In a tough February 12 Politika op-ed, he appealed to Serbs' deepest notions of collective identity and history to generate negative emotions. Konuzin writes: "NATO members... fail to point out one membership condition that is unacceptable for any Serb: Serbia's accession to the military alliance in its 'castrated' form without Kosovo. It would be the accession of a 'broken Serbia' that is to renounce its history and the sacred tombs of its heroic ancestors who laid down their lives to establish the Serbian nation." Referring to the 1999 campaign, he wrote: "It was the first time a European country was bombed after World War II. And it was a Slavic country, an Orthodox country. They didn't just bomb Serbia, they bombed every Serbian family, and not only with bombs but also politically and morally. The political bombers are still cruising above the country." As a solution for Serbia's strategic security goal, Konuzin offered President Medvedev's vision of Serbia in a new, Russian-proposed European security architecture. Though appealing to the average Serb, this op-ed was nonetheless risky, since it cynically brought emotion into an increasingly objective debate among intellectuals, and invited an attack in the same paper by an otherwise anti-NATO columnist, and even a few sharp comments on Politika's website such
as, "Russia wants to fight NATO down to the last Serb."

Tadic Brings Clarity -------------------- ¶16. (U) After this op-ed appeared, on February 15 President Tadic joined the debate. There will be no parliamentary election before the government's term of office expires in 2012, during which time the question of Serbia's membership in NATO will not be raised either, he clarified. He also dismissed calls for a referendum, saying "You don't hold a referendum on what you don't want." Serbia will continue to develop its relations with NATO in the coming period as it has so far, through the Partnership for Peace [PfP] program, he added.

Comment ------- ¶17. (SBU) Without clear political will from the government and even tacit support from relevant opposition parties, moving public opinion on NATO will be a long, difficult slog. Emotions are deep. Yet this debate itself, and even the glimmer of support shown by polling results, are encouraging signs. Recent polls found that although over 50% of respondents were opposed to joining NATO, 20% were in favor and 30% undecided. Kosovo is a dominant factor in keeping those numbers from increasing. Still, two years ago few would have predicted Serbia would declare EU membership as a strategic goal, as is the case today. In fact, there does seem to be a growing quiet consensus within the current government that Serbia's long-term future lies in becoming not only a member of the European Union, but a part of the broader Euro-Atlantic security alliance as well - precisely in keeping with its more robust stance
in support of NATO membership for Bosnia and other countries in the region. Whatever trajectory Serbia may be on - even if it is less a matter of "if" but "when" - it will be important for U.S. interests and those of our allies to continue to explore ways to deepen Serbia's PfP engagement, reinforce the principle of NATO's open door and sustain our activities in the areas of education, engagement and consistent public diplomacy. End Comment.
WARLICK

Preneto sa http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BELGRADE324.html